Price of Anarchy of The Airport Operator, Airline and Traveller Social Costs Using The Game Theory

Abstract

This paper discusses the Price of Anarchy of the airport operator, airline, and traveller using Game theory of all players in the system due to the flight departure delay. These study could gauge the social cost incurred by airport operator, airline, and traveller due to operational glitch that delays the flight departure from its schedule for more than two hours in airport. In airport operation management, the delay may be due to rescheduling of departure time, technical faulty, inefficient airline staff, operational glitch, security reason, bad weather, and other reasons that could cause congestion in the terminal and airfield area. However, this study only focuses on the social cost incurred by the airport operator (player 1) and traveller (player 3) due to flight delay caused by airline (player 2). This problem could cause congestion in the terminal because the airport operator (player 1) needs to hold the traveller (player 3) for longer period of time and this depends on the rescheduled time of the next flight by the airline (player 2). Due to this incident, the airport operator (player 1) and traveller (player 3) have incurred higher social cost. This study uses the analytical tools that can evaluate the potential increase of the social cost as the sum of the players.